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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Choi and Gulati’s proposal for a tournament of judges,1 with ap-
pointment to the U.S. Supreme Court as the prize, has generated a 
furor and, more importantly, this law review Symposium. In re-
sponse to an earlier version of their article, I raised a number of con-
cerns with their proposal.2 In this Essay, I will expand upon some of 
these concerns and discuss how Choi and Gulati address them in the 
final version of their article. 
 Choi and Gulati correctly view the nomination and confirmation of 
Supreme Court Justices as driven largely by politics.3 Although they 
do not oppose politics playing some role in the selection of judges,4 
they object to arguments about a judge’s political views being dis-
guised as arguments about a judge’s nonpolitical qualifications, 
which they refer to as a judge’s “merit.”5 They argue that such mis-
characterization delays the confirmation process by allowing political 
battles to be fought under a more respectable, nonpolitical pretext 
and unfairly tarnishes the reputation of nominees by encouraging in-
sincere objections to their merit.6  
 To solve this problem, Choi and Gulati present an interesting pro-
posal: all judges on U.S. courts of appeals will receive a ranking that 
reflects their merit.7 The ranking will be based solely on a number of 
quantitative, objective criteria that are correlated with a judge’s 
merit, such as the number of opinions the judge has published and 
                                                                                                                     
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. J.D., Ph.D., 
Stanford University, 1996; B.A., B.S., University of Pennsylvania, 1988. I am grateful to 
Michael Green, David Logan, Alan Palmiter, and Ronald Wright for helpful comments. 
 1. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 
(2004). 
 2. Some of these concerns were summarized in my contribution to a Jurist online 
symposium on the judicial confirmation process. See Ahmed E. Taha, Information and the 
Selection of Judges, Jurist, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-jc/choi-gulati-
orth-taha.php (Apr. 15, 2004). 
 3. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 299. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. at 301-02. 
 6. Id. at 299. 
 7. Id. at 303. 
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the number of times his or her opinions are cited by other judges or 
by legal scholars.8   
 Of course, if those involved in the judicial nomination and confir-
mation process still wished to support or oppose a Supreme Court 
nominee for political reasons, they could nonetheless use the guise of 
a merit-based argument by claiming that the ranking is a flawed 
measure of merit. They will allege that a more accurate measure 
would have led to a different conclusion regarding the nominee’s 
merit and will claim to support or oppose the candidate on such al-
ternate merit-based grounds, although they are truly motivated by 
political considerations. To prevent such subterfuge, Choi and Gulati 
propose—as an extreme version of their proposal—that the President 
and Senators not be permitted to put forth merit-based rationale 
other than the ranking.9  
 They suggest, as more modest reforms, simply publicizing judges’ 
merit rankings and/or the judges’ scores in the criteria that underlie 
the ranking.10 They argue that this publicity would encourage the use 
of such factors in nominating and confirming judges and would pres-
sure the President and Senators to provide an explanation when 
their support of, or opposition to, a particular nominee does not con-
form to such objective measures of merit.11 
 In addition, Choi and Gulati argue that a ranking system would 
encourage desirable judicial behavior.12 Judges who have Supreme 
Court aspirations will seek to improve their rankings,13 and even 
judges who are not motivated by such hopes will seek high rankings 
to build their reputations as good judges.14  
 Although I do not believe that the current judicial selection proc-
ess should be replaced with a tournament, Choi and Gulati’s proposal 
is valuable because it encourages discussion focused on identifying 
the characteristics of a good judge and how to measure those charac-
teristics. In addition, when refined, such measurements could pro-
vide useful information to persons involved in the judicial nomina-
tion and confirmation process. Nevertheless, when it comes to a 
tournament, the devil may be in the details. Although Choi and Gu-
lati believe that even a flawed tournament would be better than the 
current selection process,15 a seriously flawed ranking system could 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 313. 
 10. Id. at 322. 
 11. See id. at 312. 
 12. Id. at 313-15. 
 13. Id. at 314-15. 
 14. Id. at 313-14. 
 15. Id. at 304. 
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create undesirable incentives for judges and could actually make the 
judicial selection process, and the judiciary itself, more political. 
 In this Essay, therefore, I wish to discuss some reservations re-
garding the tournament proposal. These fall under two broad catego-
ries: the effect of rankings on the judicial nomination and confirma-
tion process and the effect of rankings on judges’ behavior. In addi-
tion, I argue that the case for a tournament of judges is stronger for 
positions in U.S. courts of appeals than on the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Federal appellate judges often come from the ranks of federal district 
judges, and a ranking of federal district judges would avoid many of 
the problems that might be created by ranking appellate judges. In 
addition, federal district judges are more likely than federal appel-
late judges to respond to the incentives created by a tournament. 
II.   EFFECT ON THE SELECTION OF JUDGES 
 The effect of a ranking system on the judicial nomination and con-
firmation process depends upon the extent to which the President 
and Senate take the ranking seriously. If the ranking is perceived as 
a largely flawed measure of judicial merit, it is unlikely to influence 
significantly the selection of judges, even if citing alternative meas-
ures of merit is prohibited. Opponents of a particular judge’s ranking 
will point out the ranking system’s serious defects and may persua-
sively argue that the ranking should be ignored. 
 Thus, Choi and Gulati’s proposed gag rule on alternative merit 
arguments makes it even more important that the ranking be well 
regarded by those persons involved in the nomination and confirma-
tion process. If the ranking is perceived as a very weak measure of 
merit and the President and Senate are prevented from pointing to 
other indicators of merit, the selection process might place even less 
weight on judicial merit than it does currently.  
 Ultimately, then, the effect of a ranking system may depend upon 
how accurately the ranking is perceived to measure judicial merit. Of 
course, any ranking based on objective measures will be imperfect. It 
is beyond the scope of Choi and Gulati’s article to specify exactly 
which criteria should be included in the ranking and, as important, 
the weight that each criterion should receive in calculating the rank-
ing. Nevertheless, they discuss several criteria that might be in-
cluded in the ranking, including a judge’s publication rate,16 the 
number of citations by other judges and by legal scholars to those de-
cisions,17 and how often the judge is reversed.18 However, an analysis 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 303. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 307. 
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of these criteria demonstrates the limitations of any ranking meth-
odology.  
 As Choi and Gulati note, the fact that a U.S. court of appeals gen-
erally decides cases in panels of three judges limits the usefulness of 
any objective measure of the quality of a particular judge, including 
the number of opinions the judge publishes.19 For example, deciding 
which panel member will write the majority opinion—and whether 
an opinion should be written or published at all—is a group deci-
sion.20 Thus, the number and topics of opinions that a judge pub-
lishes and the resulting total number of citations to a judge’s opin-
ions are partly determined by the publication preferences of other 
judges in the circuit. 
 Intercircuit comparisons of judges are less meaningful than com-
parisons within a circuit. Each U.S. court of appeals has adopted its 
own criteria for the publication of opinions, and these criteria may af-
fect the number of opinions judges in that circuit publish.21 Intercir-
cuit differences in the number and types of cases filed might also af-
fect the number of cases a particular judge hears or the judge’s publi-
cation rate.22 The total number of citations to a judge’s opinions 
should also be higher if the judge publishes more opinions. Also, the 
effects of deciding cases in three-judge panels likely differ across cir-
cuits. For example, a judge in a circuit where other judges disfavor 
frequent publication of opinions may publish less than she would if 
she were in a circuit where the other judges favor publishing.  
 The difficulty of intercircuit comparisons is not fatal for a ranking 
system. For example, a criterion in the ranking could be how many 
opinions a judge has published, relative to the average number of 
published opinions by other judges in the same circuit. However, that 
adjustment would discount the effort of judges in circuits where pub-
lication is more favored. Although such issues do not mean that a 
ranking will not contain valuable information regarding judicial 
merit, they do suggest that any objective measure of merit will be 
subject to valid criticisms. Such criticisms would certainly be made 
by those persons in the judicial selection process who support a judi-
                                                                                                                     
 19. Id. at 308-09. 
 20. Usually the panel’s presiding judge decides who will write the majority opinion, 
but this decision is greatly influenced by the wishes of the panel’s other judges. 
 21. Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts 
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 86-91 (2001).  
 22. For example, researchers have found that cases involving certain subject matters 
(such as civil rights and new areas of the law) are more likely to result in published deci-
sions by federal district courts. Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through 
Published Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782, 790-91 (1992); Peter Siegelman & 
John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and 
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1156 (1990). 
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cial nominee with a low ranking or who oppose a nominee with a 
high ranking. 
 Unfortunately, even if an objective ranking is constructed that 
fairly and accurately measures merit, it might not significantly affect 
the judicial selection process. Most of the ranking criteria that the 
authors suggest are already easily accessible. For example, the Presi-
dent’s or Senators’ staffs already can search Westlaw or LEXIS to 
calculate the number of opinions a judicial nominee has published 
and the number of citations to those opinions. Indeed, a judge’s opin-
ions are already read as part of the selection process. The fact that 
neither the number of opinions a judge publishes nor the number of 
citations to those opinions is currently used in the debate over nomi-
nees indicates that those involved in judicial selection do not believe 
these measures are relevant to the selection decision. Thus, we 
should not be confident that they will pay attention to rankings that 
are based on such criteria.  
 More generally, all participants in, and most observers of, the ju-
dicial selection process know that politics play a large role. The 
President rarely nominates candidates outside of his party,23 and 
when there is significant disagreement in the Senate about a candi-
date, the vote splits largely on party lines.24 Also, the vocal interest 
groups that get involved in the selection process are typically seeking 
a judge who supports their positions on particular political issues.25 
The fact that the President has the opportunity to fill any Supreme 
Court vacancies that arise has even been a campaign issue in recent 
presidential elections. 
 This raises another important limitation of a ranking system. A 
main purpose of Choi and Gulati’s proposal is to encourage honesty 
and transparency.26 No longer could preferences regarding a judge’s 
political or judicial ideology be hidden behind merit-based argu-
ments. However, the ranking system will not reduce some of the ma-
jor related problems that they identify.  
 Choi and Gulati lament the primary role politics plays in the con-
firmation process and point out the frequent hypocrisy exhibited by 
those involved in the process. They endorse Erwin Chemerinsky’s ob-
servation that when it is in a preferred candidate’s interest, many 
participants in the confirmation process switch their own stated posi-
                                                                                                                     
 23. Erwin Chemerinsky, Ideology and the Selection of Federal Judges, 36 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 619, 624 (2003). 
 24. For example, two recent controversial nominees to U.S. Courts of Appeals—Texas 
Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen and U.S. District Court Judge Charles Pickering—
were rejected by the Senate Judiciary Committee on party-line votes. Helen Dewar, Senate 
Panel Rejects Bush Court Nominee, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2002, at A1. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 312-13. 
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tions regarding whether a nominee’s political views are relevant.27 
This inconsistency may contribute to the cynicism that many Ameri-
cans have about their elected officials and about the judicial selection 
process. 
 However, a ranking system will not reduce this problem. Even in 
its most extreme form—which prohibits other merit-based argu-
ments—their proposal will prevent only disputes about a judge’s 
merit. Participants in the confirmation process will still argue 
about—and take inconsistent positions regarding—the relevance of a 
nominee’s political views. In addition, there will still be intense de-
bates about whether a judge actually has extreme political views.  
 Although there might be some increase in transparency by forcing 
such political debate from behind a “merit” mask, this effect may not 
be great. Indeed, as the debates surrounding Chief Justice Bird and 
Judge Bork illustrate, politicians are willing to make explicitly politi-
cal arguments regarding a judicial nominee. This also suggests little 
cause for optimism that a ranking system would cause the judicial 
nomination and confirmation process to take place more rapidly. All 
the parties involved in confirmation battles likely know they are 
principally battles about politics, not about merit, even if they are 
sometimes phrased in merit terminology. Although a ranking system 
may make these confirmation battles more explicitly about politics, 
these battles will probably remain as intense and protracted as they 
are currently. 
 Ironically, if a ranking system does increase the emphasis that 
the confirmation process places on a judge’s merit, it might have an-
other undesirable effect: it may allow a President to nominate more 
politically extreme candidates who happen to have high merit rank-
ings. This could lead to an even more protracted and heated confir-
mation process, as well as a more politically extreme or splintered 
Supreme Court.  
                                                                                                                     
 27. Id. at 322 n.6. Specifically, Chemerinsky observed that 
[i]n California, in 1986, conservatives argued that [Chief Justice Rose] Bird, 
and two other Justices . . . should be rejected because of their liberal views and 
prior votes, especially in death penalty cases. Liberals in California argued that 
assuring judicial independence required that evaluation be limited to the jus-
tices’ competence; that the individual’s ideology and prior votes should play no 
role in the retention process. But the sides were reversed a year later in a bat-
tle over the [Judge] Bork confirmation. It was the liberals who argued that 
Bork should be rejected because of his conservative views and prior votes as a 
court of appeals judge. Conservatives argued that evaluation should be limited 
to the nominee’s competence—that his ideology and prior votes should play no 
role in the Senate’s confirmation decision. 
Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 624. 
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III.   EFFECT ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
 In addition to addressing the effect of a judicial ranking system on 
the judicial selection process, Choi and Gulati raise important issues 
regarding the effect of a ranking system on judges’ behavior. There is 
substantial recent evidence that federal judges respond to incentives, 
including the opportunity to be appointed to a higher court.28 There-
fore, the judicial incentives created by a ranking system must be con-
sidered. 
 A ranking system that rewards the publishing of opinions may 
cause some judges to publish more opinions. However, it is probably 
not desirable for judges to spend their (and their clerks’) time writing 
publishable opinions for legally insignificant cases. Such an incentive 
problem might be reduced by also including as a criterion the aver-
age number of citations to the judge’s opinions, because insignificant 
opinions are unlikely to be cited.29 However, including the average 
number of citations might encourage judges to use novel reasoning or 
reach atypical conclusions so as to increase the number of citations to 
their opinions. Choi and Gulati discount the possibility that judges 
will react this way. They argue that novel opinions are less likely to 
be cited by other judges.30 This is likely true in absolute terms; fewer 
judges are likely to agree with an unusual opinion. However, an opin-
ion that takes a common approach to an issue will have much more 
competition. Judges can choose to cite either that opinion or, instead, 
to cite one of many other opinions making the same point. By defini-
tion, however, an unusual approach is one that has not been adopted 
by many courts, and thus a judge wishing to cite to such an opinion 
will have fewer to choose among. Because fewer such opinions exist, 
they may be more likely to be cited than an opinion that adopts a 
widely shared view. 
 For the same reason, even if no judges respond to a ranking sys-
tem by publishing more novel opinions, including the number of cita-
                                                                                                                     
 28. S. Scott Gaille, Publishing by United States Court of Appeals Judges: Before and 
After the Bork Hearings, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1997) (finding that federal appellate 
judges reduced their publication of books and articles after the confirmation hearings for 
Judge Bork’s Supreme Court nomination focused negatively upon parts of his publica-
tions); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical 
Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1465-70 (1998) (finding that federal 
district judges with a higher chance of promotion to a U.S. court of appeals were more 
likely to find the politically popular Federal Sentencing Guidelines constitutional); Ahmed 
E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 1, 15, 22 (2004) (finding that federal district judges with a higher chance of promotion 
were more likely to publish their opinions regarding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ 
constitutionality). 
 29. Choi and Gulati suggest that using the number of citations as a criterion may be a 
solution to the similar problem of judges writing numerous low-quality opinions quickly to 
boost their publication rate. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 311-12. 
 30. Id. at 311 n.30. 
1408  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1401 
 
tions as a criterion might result in creative judges receiving higher 
merit rankings. Although creative thinking is desirable in many 
fields, it may not be desirable in the judiciary. In fact, “exceptionably 
able” judges are viewed suspiciously by their peers, who suspect that 
such judges have an agenda.31 This suspicion may be unwarranted, 
but novel opinions are not necessarily better opinions. However, a 
ranking system that rewards frequency of citation may implicitly 
make that assumption. 
 Other criteria that likely would be included in the ranking also 
could create unintended and undesirable incentives. For example, 
Choi and Gulati suggest as a criterion the percentage of the judge’s 
decisions that are reversed by the circuit en banc or by the Supreme 
Court.32 Reversal rate may provide useful information regarding how 
frequently a judge commits errors. However, using it as a ranking 
factor also provides an incentive for a judge to make decisions that 
the majority of the other judges in the circuit and the current major-
ity of the Supreme Court will agree with, rather than what the judge 
thinks are the correct decisions. In addition, using reversal rate will 
unfairly disadvantage a judge who has a political or judicial philoso-
phy different from that of the majority of the rest of the circuit and of 
the Supreme Court. 
 Choi and Gulati acknowledge this problem and thus suggest giv-
ing more weight to reversals by judges with the same political orien-
tation as the judge.33 For example, a Democratic judge who is re-
versed by a court with a majority of Democratic judges would have 
her ranking reduced more than if she were reversed by a court with a 
majority of Republican judges.34 Although Choi and Gulati do not 
suggest it, one could imagine a similar adjustment for the number of 
citations to a judge’s opinions: unfavorable citations of a Democratic 
judge by other Democratic judges would adversely affect that judge’s 
ranking more than would unfavorable citations by Republican 
judges. 
 However, such adjustments might actually increase the political 
partisanship of the judiciary. For example, if error is assumed when 
a judge disagrees with other judges of the same party, then judges 
will feel pressure to decide cases consistently with how other judges 
of the same party do. For example, a particular Republican judge 
may generally make politically conservative decisions, except on 
criminal procedure cases. A ranking system that penalizes him more 
for reversals of his decisions by other Republican judges than by De-
                                                                                                                     
 31. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 110 (1995).  
 32. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 307. 
 33. See id. at 310 n.29.  
 34. The phrase “Democratic judge” refers to a judge appointed by a Democratic Presi-
dent, and “Republican judge” refers to a judge appointed by a Republican President. 
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mocratic judges will create an incentive for him to also make politi-
cally conservative decisions on criminal procedure cases.  
 Choi and Gulati recognize the importance of judges’ political inde-
pendence. In fact, they suggest that the rankings should reward 
judges who rule differently from other judges who were appointed by 
a President of the same party.35 However, as just noted, this would 
also be inconsistent with giving more weight to reversals by judges of 
the same political party. This inconsistency illustrates another diffi-
culty in constructing a valid ranking system: some objective meas-
ures of merit are subject to multiple, and even contradictory, inter-
pretations. 
 Another reason to be concerned by a ranking system is its inter-
jection of competition into an appellate judiciary which relies upon 
cooperation and collegiality. Competition might undermine collegial-
ity in a circuit. Many federal appellate judges have written about the 
importance of collegiality among judges on a court.36 As Judge Ed-
wards points out, “In a collegial environment, divergent views are 
more likely to gain a full airing in the deliberative process—judges go 
back and forth in their deliberations over disputed and difficult is-
sues until agreement is reached.”37  
 The effect of collegiality can be seen in recent empirical scholar-
ship on U.S. courts of appeals verifying that interaction with col-
leagues affects judges’ decisions. In fact, in some areas of the law, the 
political orientation of the other two judges on a three-judge panel is 
at least as good a predictor of a judge’s vote as is the judge’s own po-
litical orientation.38 For example, a Republican judge sitting on a 
three-judge panel with two Democratic judges is more likely to vote 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 310. 
 36. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL 
APPELLATE BENCH 172 (1980) (“[C]ollegiality has much to do with the flavor, quality, 
and—at their best—the wisdom of appellate opinions . . . .”); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects 
of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1640-41 (2003) 
(“[C]ollegiality mitigates judges’ ideological preferences and enables us to find common 
ground and reach better decisions.”); Michael R. Murphy, Collegiality and Technology, 2 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 455, 456 (2000) (“The product of a collegial court, its opinions, are 
‘better in substance, style, and tone’ than those of a court which expends little effort to 
harmonize diverse views.” (quoting FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, 
AND JUDGING 228 (1994) [hereinafter COFFIN, ON APPEAL])); Patricia M. Wald, Calendars, 
Collegiality, and Other Intangibles on the Courts of Appeals, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE 
JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 171, 178 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. 
Wheeler eds., 1989) (calling collegiality “all important” to appellate courts).  
 37. Edwards, supra note 36, at 1646.  
 38. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts 
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 317 (2004).  
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to uphold an affirmative action program than is a Democratic judge 
sitting on a panel with two Republican judges.39  
 This collegiality could be undermined if judges respond to the in-
centives created by a tournament. For example, imagine that Judge 
A is on a three-judge panel with Judges B and C, and Judge C is as-
signed to write the majority opinion in a noteworthy case that is 
likely to be cited by other courts. If Judge A joins the majority opin-
ion, she will receive no credit in the rankings for citations to that 
opinion, even if her comments were crucial in shaping Judge C’s 
opinion.40 However, if Judge A instead writes a concurring or dissent-
ing opinion, then Judge A might be cited by other courts and have 
her ranking increased.  
 Choi and Gulati argue that because judges hear multiple cases to-
gether, such uncooperative behavior will be deterred, because other 
judges may retaliate by engaging in similar conduct when the unco-
operative judge must write the majority opinion. Indeed, the fact that 
judges on the same court are repeat players with each other may de-
ter some uncooperative behavior. However, this is likely more true in 
circuits that have relatively few judges. In these smaller circuits, the 
judges hear cases with the same judges more often than in larger cir-
cuits, and thus the effect of repeated interactions should be greater.41 
As Judge Coffin states, “The difference in the collegial atmosphere 
between sitting with all of one’s colleagues each month and sitting 
with each only once or twice or even three times a year is enor-
mous.”42 
 In addition, repeated interaction cannot be expected to prevent all 
judges from attempting to manipulate their rankings. Despite the 
benefits of working together collegially, even under the current sys-
tem, some courts are more collegial than others. The incentives cre-
                                                                                                                     
 39. Sunstein et al., supra note 38, at 319; see also Revesz, supra note 38, at 1719 (find-
ing that in environmental regulation cases before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, “the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has a greater bearing on a 
judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation”). Note that this also indicates that judges fre-
quently cross party lines, a practice, as argued above, that could be deterred by a rating 
system. 
 40. COFFIN, ON APPEAL, supra note 36, at 221 (recalling that “on a significant number 
of occasions [upon receiving a draft opinion from a colleague], responding judges have been 
able to present a new way of looking at a case, or a hitherto overlooked case authority, or 
some undervalued fact or procedural point, and . . . a writing judge has gracefully changed 
course”). 
 41. Because cases in U.S. courts of appeals are generally heard by three-judge panels, 
a judge is typically sitting with two other judges. Because the composition of these panels 
rotates, judges in circuits with fewer judges will hear cases with a particular judge more 
often than if they were both in a circuit with more judges. For example, a judge sitting in a 
circuit with only six judges would sit on a panel with another particular judge approxi-
mately forty percent of the time. In a circuit with twelve judges, a judge would sit with an-
other particular judge only approximately eighteen percent of the time. 
 42. COFFIN, ON APPEAL, supra note 36, at 216. 
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ated by a ranking system would create additional pressure on colle-
giality. 
 Finally, any incentive effects of a ranking system are limited by 
the fact that few judges have a realistic chance of being appointed to 
the Supreme Court. For many judges, the chance of nomination is so 
remote that it will not affect their behavior.43 However, Choi and Gu-
lati point out that a ranking system might still provide positive in-
centives for those judges as well. They argue that those judges may 
be motivated to compete on these criteria simply out of concern that 
their ranking might affect their reputation.44 
 Most judges care about their reputation, “both with other judges, 
especially ones on the same court . . . [,] and with the legal profession 
at large.”45 However, this concern may not translate into judges being 
motivated by a ranking system, especially if judges and the broader 
legal profession do not believe that the ranking is an accurate meas-
ure of a judge’s quality.  
 Currently, a judge’s reputation is primarily based upon the im-
pressions of those who work with the judge, litigate in front of the 
judge, or read the judge’s opinions.46 One must question whether 
these impressions of a judge’s quality would be significantly altered 
by an imperfect ranking system. This is particularly true if, when the 
rankings are made public, some highly regarded judges have lower 
rankings than lesser-regarded judges.  
 Choi and Gulati respond that, nevertheless, a ranking might mo-
tivate judges because law students who are potential law clerks may 
prefer to work for a higher-ranked judge.47 Law students generally 
lack familiarity with particular judges and thus are more likely than 
others to be influenced by the rankings. To secure the most desirable 
law clerks, a judge might be motivated to take actions that increase 
his ranking.  
 This raises the possibility that a ranking will become influential 
not because it is accurate but because it is the only information 
available to uninformed law students. We have seen this phenome-
                                                                                                                     
 43. POSNER, supra note 31, at 111. Choi and Gulati note that the high value of the 
tournament’s prize—a spot on the Supreme Court—may still motivate some judges who 
have only a small chance of winning. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 314-15. This may be 
true of some judges; however, many other judges in the middle of the rankings and below 
will be aware that they do not have any realistic chance of winning the tournament and 
thus likely will not be affected by the tournament.  
 44. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 313-14.  
 45. POSNER, supra note 31, at 119. 
 46. Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of 
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 629 (2000). 
 47. Choi & Gulati, supra note 1, at 314.  
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non before: despite being heavily criticized as being inaccurate,48 the 
annual U.S. News and World Report law school rankings are impor-
tant.49 Their importance results largely from the great attention they 
are given by prospective law students, who have little other basis for 
comparing law schools. These rankings lead some schools to take ac-
tions to unfairly manipulate their rankings.50 We should be reluctant 
to create a similar situation in the federal judiciary. 
IV.   A TOURNAMENT OF U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES? 
 For many of the reasons discussed above, a stronger case exists 
for a tournament for positions on U.S. courts of appeals than for a 
tournament for positions on the U.S. Supreme Court. U.S. court of 
appeals judges often come from the ranks of U.S. district court 
judges, and a tournament of U.S. district court judges would lack 
many of the problems of a tournament of U.S. court of appeals 
judges. In addition, federal district judges should be more likely than 
U.S. court of appeals judges to respond to the incentives created by a 
tournament. 
 Many of the problems of measuring merit are less likely to affect a 
tournament of U.S. district court judges. Because federal district 
judges generally make decisions alone,51 their opinions are less likely 
to be affected by the preferences of their colleagues. In addition, they 
have almost complete discretion over choices such as whether to pub-
lish an opinion in a particular case.52 Thus quantitative measures of 
judicial performance will be measures only of a particular judge’s be-
havior rather than also of the influence of other judges on a panel.  
 Also, unlike U.S. courts of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
almost complete control over its own docket. Thus, Supreme Court 
decisions are more likely to reflect policy judgments than are the de-
cisions of courts of appeals. This means that reversals of federal dis-
                                                                                                                     
 48. A critical study of the ranking was commissioned by the Association of American 
Law Schools (AALS). See Stephen P. Klein & Laura Hamilton, The Validity of the U.S. 
News and World Report Ranking of ABA Law Schools, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW 
SCHOOLS, at http://www.aals.org/validity.html (Feb. 18, 1998). 
 49. Julia E. Vaughan, Addressing Law Student Dishonesty: The View of One Bar Ad-
missions Official, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 1009, 1012 (2004) (“[A] hyper-competitive environment 
exists both for the aspiring law student and for law schools aspiring to improve their over-
all [U.S. News law school] ranking . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 50. For example, some schools have allegedly temporarily hired recent graduates to 
inflate the percentage of graduates who are employed, which is one component of the rank-
ing. For other examples of how some law schools have attempted to manipulate their U.S. 
News rankings, see Dale Whitman, Doing the Right Thing, NEWSLETTER (Ass’n Am. Law 
Sch., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 2002, at 1, 1-4. 
 51. U.S. district courts occasionally hear cases in three-judge panels. See 28 U.S.C. § 
2284 (2000). In addition, on rare occasions, U.S. district courts have sat en banc to decide a 
case. See, e.g., United States v. Bogle, 689 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 
 52. Taha, supra note 28, at 4. 
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trict courts are less likely to reflect political disagreements than are 
reversals of federal appellate courts. Thus, the rate at which a judge 
is reversed would be a better—though still imperfect—measure of the 
merit of federal district judges than of federal appellate judges. 
 In addition, although collegiality can affect the operation of U.S. 
district courts,53 it is more important at the appellate level; U.S. dis-
trict judges generally decide cases alone. Thus, concerns about the 
possible adverse effects of a tournament on collegiality are less im-
portant for U.S. district courts.   
 Finally, a federal district judge’s chance of promotion to a U.S. 
court of appeals is much higher than a federal appellate judge’s 
chance of promotion to the U.S. Supreme Court. There are 167 au-
thorized judgeships in the twelve geographic circuits and only nine 
Supreme Court Justices, a ratio of almost 19 to 1. However, there are 
676 authorized U.S. district court judgeships, which means that 
there are only about four district court judgeships for every U.S. 
court of appeals judgeship.54 This lower ratio means that federal dis-
trict judges have a more realistic chance of promotion to a U.S. court 
of appeals than do federal appellate judges to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Thus they would be more likely to respond to the incentives 
created by a ranking system.55  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Although the Supreme Court Justices should not be chosen by a 
tournament of judges, Choi and Gulati may have started a valuable 
process. Their proposal has focused attention on defining the charac-
teristics of a good judge and on how to measure those characteristics. 
Although objective measures of merit will always be limited and im-
perfect, I share Choi and Gulati’s optimism that even flawed meas-
ures of merit will encourage the development of better measures. As 
these measures improve, they may provide valuable information to 
the judicial selection process. One can envision these measures even-
tually supplementing, though not replacing, the subjective ratings 
given to judicial nominees by the American Bar Association’s Stand-
ing Committee on the Federal Judiciary.56 The development of a well-
                                                                                                                     
 53. Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels Affect Judges: Evidence from U.S. District Courts, 39 
U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).  
 54. Because federal district judges are typically promoted to the U.S. court of appeals 
that covers the district they are in and court of appeals judgeships are normally reserved 
for a judge from a particular state, the true ratio facing a particular district judge will dif-
fer. Sisk et al., supra note 28, at 1424. 
 55. Of course, if U.S. court of appeals judges value a position on the U.S. Supreme 
Court more than federal district judges value a position on a U.S. court of appeals, then the 
effect of this higher probability of winning the tournament will be at least partially offset. 
 56. The ABA evaluates a judicial nominee’s integrity, professional competence, 
and judicial temperament by reading the nominee’s legal writings, conducting exten-
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regarded, objective ranking system might pressure Presidents to ex-
plain why they nominated low-ranked candidates and pressure Sena-
tors to explain why they oppose highly ranked candidates. As a re-
sult, the judicial nomination and confirmation process might eventu-
ally put more emphasis on nonpolitical factors.  
 
                                                                                                                     
sive interviews of persons who know the nominee, and considering comments that it 
receives from others. AM. BAR ASS’N, THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 5-7, 9-10 (2005), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/Federal_Judiciary%20(2).pdf. Although they are sub-
jective, the ABA’s ratings of judicial nominees “are seen by most observers as a rough 
measure of how leading members of the bar and bench view the candidates for judicial 
positions.” Sheldon Goldman et al., Clinton’s Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 
JUDICATURE 228, 245 (2001).  
